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Theo A. F. Kuipers 
CAUSAL COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURED WHOLES 
REPLY TO ROBERT CAUSEY 
Robert Causey’s contribution reminds me of at least two preliminary points. 
First, as I also state in the Foreword to SiS, his work, notably his Unity of 
Science, has played an important role in my work, witness in particular Ch. 5, 
but also Ch. 3 and 6. It is an honor for me that he now presents new ideas in 
the context of my analysis of reduction of laws and concepts. Second, 
‘structures’ in the title SiS can refer to at least three main uses: the primarily 
intended meta-sense of patterns in scientific knowledge and knowledge 
acquisition, the also intended mathematical sense of structures as used to 
formally represent objects of scientific interest, and finally the ontological-
cum-epistemological sense of the nature of certain kinds of objects in the real 
world, the sense intended by Causey. He develops the notion of a “structured 
whole” in terms of bonding relations between elements of a (macro-) object 
(and perhaps its boundary), also simply called bonds, a stable configuration 
and a theory causally explaining the bonds and the stable configuration. In this 
way, Causey builds a notion that is at least characteristically, if not 
fundamentally, presupposed in cases of successful microreduction. In this 
reply I restrict myself to situating the idealized character of many examples of 
microreduction and to questioning whether a structured whole is a prerequisite 
for a genuine reduction. 
Causal Composition 
Robert Causey is quite right in suggesting that in typical cases of 
microreduction of a law  the crucial aggregation step together with one or 
more identification steps  the relevant macro-system or -object is a 
“structured whole” of one kind or another. As he also rightly notes at the end 
of his paper, the microreduction of the ideal gas law is an extreme case, since 
the bonds between the molecules are neglected. The same extreme character 
holds for my second favorite example of microreduction, that of Olson’s quasi-
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law about collective goods. Like Causey, I do not see this highly idealized 
character of paradigmatic examples as a reason to view more realistic putative 
cases of reduction as completely different in some qualitative sense or as no 
reduction at all. Instead, as I have shown in detail in the case of Van der Waals 
(Kuipers 1985), the reductive explanation of a concretized law is itself a 
concretization of the reductive explanation of the corresponding idealized law. 
However, in this case the term ‘aggregation’ remains adequate, but in other 
realistic cases it is not. See, for example, point (1) of my reply to Weber and 
De Preester.
As I suggest in SiS (p. 87), in cases where more than one type of element is 
involved, ‘synthesis’ or ‘composition’ can better replace the term 
‘aggregation’. The last term or, still more specifically, the term ‘causal 
composition’ seems particularly adequate to characterize the causal 
explanation of (some aspect of) the stable configuration characteristic of a 
structured whole W, that is, an explanation “in terms of the laws of [some 
theory] T, attributes of the elements of W, and the description of the bonding 
relations between the elements of W” (USW5 in Causey’s paper).
Are Structured Wholes Presupposed in Microreduction? 
Causey also links his notion of a structured whole to my notion of a “structure 
representation function” (SiS, Ch. 5). Apart from a minor terminological point, 
this suggests an interesting question. The minor point is that I wanted to use 
the term ‘structure representation function’ primarily to refer to the type of 
values the representation function assigns to certain objects, viz. the function 
assigns mathematical structures to what I call “macro-objects” or, more 
generally, “aggregates.” These aggregates correspond to Causey’s structured 
wholes or they are at least candidates for them, that is, they form the kind of 
objects that may be qualified as structured wholes.
Now the interesting question is whether being such a structured whole is a 
necessary condition for a successful microreduction. In Ch. 5 I distinguish 
between the reduction of laws and concepts, and I distinguish a singular, a 
multiple and a quasi-form of each. Let us concentrate on the singular forms. 
Recall that in Causey’s notion of a structured whole the notion of a “stable 
configuration” which can be causally explained (USW5) is crucial. I certainly 
believe that obeying a macro-law requires a configuration that is in some sense 
stable, and hence, if it can be causally explained in terms of bonds between the 
elements themselves or between the elements and the boundary of the system, 
the configuration is a structured whole. However, this does not imply that 
every conceivable (singular) micro-reduction of a law governing an aggregate 
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requires that this aggregate is a structured whole, for the relevant explanation 
may be of a different nature. The situation is similar for the case of 
microreduction of macro-properties, that is, properties of macro-objects. In SiS 
(p. 138) I claim the following: “Concept reduction only requires concepts at 
the side to be reduced, which is, of course, supposed to imply that these 
concepts are relatively stable and intersubjectively applicable.” Hence, it 
seems that (singular) concept (micro-)reduction already requires a stable 
configuration. But again this need not imply that the relevant explanation is of 
the kind required for a structured whole. 
For example, although in the case (see Causey’s Section 2) of the balloons 
that are maintained in a certain configuration, say a sheeplike cloud, only by 
external forces, the notion of a structured whole does certainly not apply, the 
sheeplike cloud of balloons is nevertheless the aggregate effect of the external 
forces operating on the individual balloons, which can hence be microreduced 
in that sense. To be sure, such aggregates are not very typical, and Causey’s 
other examples, including those of the “social structure” of robots, are more 
interesting. I should add that I have no doubt that detailed analysis would show 
that circuit examples such as the very instructive example of Weber and De 
Preester, presented in this volume to illustrate the microreduction of laws of 
artificial systems, and my own favorite example for introducing the idea of 
(actual and nomic) truth approximation (ICR, Ch. 7), are also typical cases of 
structured wholes. 
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